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BALANCING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND A STATE’S
RIGHT TO DEVELOP IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE INTER-AMERICAN RIGHTS REGIME AND ILO CONVENTION 169
by David C. Baluarte*
INTRODUCTION

L

atin America is a unique continent in many respects. Its
vicious colonial history, characterized by the enslavement of indigenous peoples and the extraction of limitless wealth by occupying powers, left modern society to cope
with a legacy of oppression. However, many critics believe that
post-colonial marginalization of Native Latin Americans is
largely equivalent to the oppression attributed to the colonial
architects.1 Much of this abuse has occurred in the name of
development: expansive industrialization projects that overtake
indigenous lands and decimate cultures. However, in Latin
America, which is a patchwork of nations plagued by large populations of rural and urban poor, development is both a right and
a responsibility of all national governments.2
Many Latin American governments view the exploitation
of the continent’s natural wealth as their only escape from
poverty. Latin America sits atop the second largest petroleum
reserves in the world, and the vast Amazon is home to a variety
of other valuable resources. Petroleum is one of the most reliable revenue producers in the world, and the prevailing property rights regime gives the government complete control over
sub-surface resources, regardless of land title.3 Building dams
and roads and clearing forests is a necessary step not only in the
exploitation of petroleum, but in the exportation of products
such as timber and precious metals. Many of these projects,
however, negatively affect the environments of indigenous communities where these valuable products are found. The question
is then one of balancing indigenous rights to land and culture
with the State’s right, as representative of the national population, to develop. The notion of prior informed consent effectively captures this balance.
In Latin America, the American Convention on Human
Rights (“American Convention”) provides a coherent framework for the promotion and protection of human rights in the
continent. Over the past decade, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (“Inter-American Court” or “Court”) and the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“InterAmerican Commission” or “Commission”) have used this document to develop a significant body of jurisprudence concerning the rights of indigenous communities in the Americas.4
This paper proposes using ILO Convention No. 169
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries (“ILO 169”) as an interpretive tool to advance that
body of jurisprudence. One of the central principles of ILO
169 is the right of indigenous communities to prior informed
consent based on their participation in the formation and
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implementation of development projects that will impact their
territories. The right to prior informed consent, however, has
yet to make its way into the Inter-American Commission and
Court’s interpretation of indigenous land rights under the
American Convention. Establishing ILO 169 as an interpretive
document in the inter-American human rights system would
create the possibility for advocates to solicit emergency protective measures from the system’s adjudicatory bodies when
governments fail to respect the right of indigenous peoples to
prior informed consent.
The first section of this paper articulates the content of the
indigenous land right under ILO 169. It provides specific cases
in which the ILO Committee of Experts (“ILO Committee” or
“Committee”) has found Latin American governments in violation of ILO 169 and explains the importance of applying ILO
169 principles to the process of Latin American development.
The second section provides the basis for using ILO 169 to
interpret the indigenous right to land under the American
Convention. It outlines the jurisprudence from the InterAmerican Commission and Court relating to indigenous rights
and explains how the notion of prior informed consent can be
imported into the American rights regime. Finally, the last section proposes that activists solicit precautionary and provisional
measures from the Inter-American Commission and Court to
protect the right of indigenous peoples to prior informed consent. These emergency measures could provide a means to
address potential abuses of indigenous land rights by ordering
governments to comply with their international obligations
before damage becomes irreparable.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK PROVIDED BY ILO 169
ILO 169 was adopted during the International Labour
Conference in 1989, and it entered into force two years later,
updating ILO Convention No. 107, adopted 30 years earlier.5
The first part of ILO 169, entitled “General Policy,” is composed of twelve articles that govern the six subsequent parts of
the convention, each of which discusses a substantive area of
rights.6 The first substantive right discussed, the right to land,
is the focus of this analysis. That part includes seven articles
that, when read together with the first twelve, articulate an elaborate framework of a state’s responsibilities when it plans to
carry out development projects that will affect indigenous
lands. Allegations of violations of those provisions are heard by
the ILO Committee.
*David C. Baluarte is a J.D. candidate 2005, at American University,
Washington College of Law.
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PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT
The notion of prior informed consent pervades ILO 169,
but the idea can be found specifically articulated in Articles 6
and 7, commonly considered the central principles of the convention.7 Article 6 requires states party to ILO 169 to consult
indigenous peoples through appropriate procedures whenever
administrative or legislative measures are being considered that
will affect them directly, to aid in the development of institutions for that purpose, and to carry out consultations in good
faith. It further requires states to establish means by which
indigenous peoples can participate freely and meaningfully at
all levels of government decision-making and policy formation
that concern them. Though there is no requirement that the state
and the indigenous communities reach a consensus, full participation is imperative.8 Article 7 bestows on indigenous peoples
the right to determine and pursue their own priorities in their
process of development and to exercise control over their own
social, economic, and cultural development. Further, that article

Many Latin American
governments view the
exploitation of the
continent’s natural wealth
as their only escape from
poverty.
expressly grants indigenous peoples the right to “participate in
the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and
programs for national and regional development which may
affect them directly.”9 These two articles, read together, reflect
the spirit of prior informed consent, and apply to each provision
of ILO 169 that follows.

DEMARCATION OF LANDS
In 1996, the Union of Huichol Indigenous Communities of
Jalisco (“Union”) submitted a claim against Mexico through the
National Trade Union of Education Workers to the ILO
Committee alleging violations of ILO 169. In that case, indigenous communities represented by the Union alleged that the
government had illegally adjudicated 22,000 hectares of historic
land to mixed (mestizo) agrarian communities in the 1960s.10
This case was brought under Article 13, which calls on governments
to respect the cultural and spiritual relationship of indigenous
groups to their land, and Article 14, which requires governments
to demarcate indigenous lands and create procedures by which
land claims can be resolved.11 The Committee analyzed these
alleged violations in the context of Article 2, namely that
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governments: (1) will have the responsibility for developing,
with the participation of the peoples concerned, coordinated and
systematic action to ensure indigenous people are not discriminated
against under national laws; (2) will promote the economic,
social, and cultural rights of those people; and (3) will assist in
closing any socio-economic gaps that exist between the indigenous
peoples and the rest of the national population.12
In finding that Mexico had violated ILO 169, the Committee
highlighted two fundamental principles of the convention. The
first is embodied in Article 4, which directs governments to adopt
special measures as appropriate for safeguarding the persons,
institutions, property, labor, cultures, and environment of the
people affected by any project. The second was Article 6 and the
requirement of a good faith consultation when an administrative
measure could directly affect them.13 These are some of the most
prevalent issues in indigenous rights.

NATURAL RESOURCES
As mentioned above, indigenous land rights are extremely
relevant in the context of petroleum exploration. Perhaps one of
the saddest catastrophes relating to the exploitation of Latin
American petroleum reserves occurred in Ecuador, where
Texaco, in the late 1960s, dumped 4.3 million gallons of toxic
waste into the rainforest and created 627 open-air toxic waste
pits that have negatively affected approximately 80 indigenous
communities in the Amazon region.14 It was in that historical
context that the Committee evaluated a claim by the Ecuadorian
Confederation of Free Trade Union Organizations (“CEOSL”)
against Ecuador in 2000. CEOSL alleged that the government
entered into a share agreement with the company Arco Oriente,
Inc. for the exploration of hydrocarbons in a region where 70
percent of the territory of the Independent Federation of the
Shuar People is located. According to CEOSL, the government
had entered into this agreement without consulting the Shuar,
and therefore had violated Article 15 of ILO 169, among others.15
Article 15(1) provides that the rights of indigenous peoples
to their natural resources should be “specially safeguarded.”
This includes the right of these peoples to “participate in the use,
management and conservation of these resources.” Article 15(2)
makes specific reference to petroleum as state patrimony, as is
the case throughout Latin America, but reiterates the need for
governments to create and maintain procedures for consultation
and means of ascertaining whether and to what extent the interests of the indigenous populations would be prejudiced by the
exercise of these sub-surface rights.
Despite the requirements of Article 15, the Ecuadorian government stated that it did not believe consultations to be an
appropriate part of granting share agreements for activities
involving petroleum exploration and exploitation.16 In responding to this, the Committee stressed that it was fully aware of the
difficulties relating to land rights and the exploration of sub-surface resources, “particularly when differing interests and points
of view are at stake such as the economic and development
interests represented by the hydrocarbon deposits and the cultural, spiritual, social, and economic interests of the indigenous
peoples situated in the zones where those deposits are situated.”
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However, the Committee continued to stress that consultation
and participation were the very essence of ILO 169, and that
parties were required to “establish a dialogue allowing them to
find appropriate solutions in an atmosphere of mutual respect
and full participation.”17 This framework is particularly significant due to the prevalence of petroleum exploration and the
severity of the damage that can result.

REMOVAL AND RELOCATION
Occasionally, due to the scale of a development project,
state authorities may need to temporarily or permanently
remove indigenous peoples from their lands. Article 16 of ILO
169 governs the necessity and legitimacy of such procedures.
The interpretation of this article was raised before the
Committee in 1999 when it evaluated a claim by the Central
Unitary Workers’ Union (“CUT”) and the Colombian Medical
Trade Union Association (“ASMEDAS”) against Colombia.18
The primary complaint in this case concerned the failure of the
Colombian government to adequately consult the Embira Katíu
community before building a dam which flooded their historic
lands. In finding that the State had violated its obligation to consult the community under Article 6 of ILO 169, the Committee
had cause to discuss the relocation of families whose land was
flooded due to the construction
of the dam.
Article 16 of ILO 169 provides that peoples shall only be
removed from their lands as an
exceptional measure. There are
also several explicit requirements: 1) the government must
obtain consent when removal is
necessary, or establish procedures governed by national laws
when consent cannot be
obtained; 2) peoples must
always be returned to their
lands, or given functionally
equivalent lands or monetary
compensation when return is
not possible; and 3) relocated peoples should be fully compensated for any resulting loss or injury.
In the case against Colombia, the Committee appeared to
approve of the government’s efforts to fix a food and transportation subsidy, which the owners of the project would pay to
each of the affected members of the indigenous community for
the next 15 years. The Committee emphasized the importance of
ensuring the physical and cultural survival of the Embera Katío
people while they adapted their customs to the new circumstances, weathered the inevitable political and economic
changes caused by the relocation, and educated the next generation about its culture so that it would survive in the medium
term.19 The Committee also noted with approval that the government, together with indigenous representatives, had produced written agreements that granted additional land to the
Embera Katío people and made provision for other compensa-

tory measures.20 The Committee’s sanctioning of these measures gives a concrete example of what compliance with the
requirements under Article 16 might actually look like.

TRANSFER OF LAND
Another important aspect of indigenous land rights included
in ILO 169 is the transfer of those rights among members of the
peoples concerned. Article 17 requires consultation whenever
there is a proposed change in the legal recognition of a peoples’
right to alienate or transfer land rights. The Committee had
cause to interpret the parameters of this right in 1997, when the
General Confederation of Workers in Peru (“CGTP”) alleged
that Peru had violated ILO 169 when the Congress of the
Republic passed Act No. 26845 (“Act”), which changed indigenous
lands from communal to individual title based on its determination
that the latter regime was more productive.21
In finding that the Peruvian government had violated ILO
169 with the passage of the Act, the Committee held that it was
not for the government to decide whether communal or individual ownership is most appropriate for an indigenous group.
Though Article 17 does create the possibility for governments to
make decisions about the rights of indigenous peoples to alienate their lands, those decision-making processes must conform
with the consultation requirements found in Articles 6 and 7
of the Convention.22

. . . indigenous property
rights are precarious, and
causing irreparable
damage to property can
cause “irreparable damage
to persons.”
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PENALTIES & NATIONAL
PROGRAMS

The last two articles in the
land rights part of ILO 169 are
Articles 18 and 19. Article 18,
rarely invoked before the
Committee, is the punitive
corollary to the remedial regime
created both implicitly and
explicitly by the five preceding
articles. It requires governments
to establish adequate penalties
for unauthorized intrusion on or
use of indigenous lands. It is not clear whether allegations of
violations of this Article are rare because States have generally
complied, or because States are often implicated and simply do
not have the capacity to punish themselves. Finally, Article 19
calls on governments to establish national agrarian programs
where the needs of growing indigenous groups are taken into
consideration. This includes the provision of more land when
the land holding cannot sustain them and their normal activities
and the provision of means required to develop the lands they
already possess.
The indigenous right to land found in Part Two of ILO 169
offers a significantly more complete articulation of that right
than any international instrument currently in effect in the
Americas. At this point, this paper has established the content of
the indigenous land right under ILO 169 as interpreted by the
ILO Committee. What follows is an explanation of how that
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

jurisprudence could be used in the inter-American human rights
system to help further the rights of Latin American indigenous
populations.

USING ILO 169 IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
In its Advisory Opinion 10/89, the Inter-American Court
discussed the interpretation of the American Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of Man (“American Declaration”)
through the American Convention. There, the Court held that
the American law of human rights “must be interpreted and
applied within the overall framework of the juridical system in
force at the time of the interpretation,” which naturally
includes international treaties.23

THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY UNDER THE AMERICAN
CONVENTION
Article 21(1) of the American Convention states that
“[e]veryone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property,” but that “[t]he law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the social interest.” In Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, the
Inter-American Court interpreted Article 21 to protect indigenous land rights and ordered Nicaragua to legislate a procedure
for the demarcation and titling of indigenous lands.24 This monumental decision, however, did not go so far as to clarify the
extent of the indigenous right to property. Indeed, the claim
arose out of a timber concession that the Nicaraguan state had
awarded to a corporation through an administrative process.25
At no point did the Court rule on the legitimacy of that administrative process, though it is clear that the lands, once demarcated, would most likely encompass the concession. The Court’s
express denial of any reparations beyond the order to demarcate
the community’s lands leaves the question of where the line is
drawn between the indigenous right to land and the State’s right
to develop.26

USE OF “OTHER TREATIES”
Though OAS Member States have long argued against the
applicability of treaties that do not explicitly confer power on
the adjudicatory bodies of the inter-American system,27 the
interpretive power of such “other treaties” is widely accepted.
In its Advisory Opinion 1/82, the Inter-American Court
held that the Inter-American Commission “properly invoked
other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the
American states, regardless of their bilateral or multilateral
character, or whether they have been adopted within the framework or under the auspices of the inter-American system.”28 It
is conceivable that the Court, in approving of the Commission’s
application of other treaties, authorized its own use of the full
body of international law when interpreting rights guaranteed
under the American Convention. Indeed, the Court has consistently done so in deciding contentious cases.
In Baena Ricardo et. al., the Court, in its discussion of the
alleged violation of Article 16 (freedom of association) of the
American Convention, made reference to the ILO Constitution,
ILO Convention No. 87 Concerning Freedom of Association
and Protection of the Right to Organise, and ILO Convention
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No. 98 Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right
to Organise and Bargain Collectively.29 The Court also cited the
reasoning of the ILO Committee, seemingly opening the door to
the interpretive power of such jurisprudence.30 These examples
are not unique, but they effectively show the extent to which the
Inter-American Court will rely on “other treaties” and the decisions of the bodies that monitor those treaties as persuasive
interpretations of rights protected by the American Convention.

USING ILO 169 TO INTERPRET THE AMERICAN
CONVENTION
Although the Court itself has never used ILO 169 as an
interpretive tool, in its reparations decision in Aloeboetoe et. al.,
it briefly made reference to ILO 169, saying that Suriname was
not party to the convention. This language seems to imply that
the Court would have considered ILO 169 in its decision if
Suriname had been party to the convention.31 One can speculate, based on the Court’s treatment of “other treaties” and the
language in Aloeboetoe et. al. that it would be receptive to an
argument using provisions from ILO 169 to interpret the
American Convention.
Activities of the Inter-American Commission lend credence
to this supposition. The Commission used ILO 169 to interpret
the right to property guaranteed under the American Declaration
in its merits decision in Mary and Carrie Dann, a case concerning Western Shoshone land claims in the United States. In that
case, the Commission spoke of a set of general international
legal principles applicable in the context of indigenous human
rights. The Commission drew heavily from ILO 169, specifically Articles 13, 14, and 15, in articulating those principles which
include the right of indigenous groups to exercise legal ownership over the lands they have traditionally occupied, in the manner in which they have traditionally occupied them, and that
such title can only change through mutual consent and with due
compensation.32 This is significant due to both the
Commission’s use of “other treaties” to interpret the American
Declaration and because the United States, while bound by the
American Declaration, is not a signatory of ILO 169.
The Commission spoke specifically about ILO 169 in its
Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru. After
reiterating the principle that “international human rights instruments of both the inter-American and universal systems contain
provisions relevant to the analysis of the situation of indigenous
communities,”33 the Commission goes on to say that,
“[t]he most relevant international instrument is ILO
Convention 169 on indigenous and tribal peoples, ratified by Peru on February 2, 1994. That Convention
establishes obligations to consult and include the participation of indigenous peoples in respect of matters that
affect them…On ratifying this instrument, the Peruvian
State undertook to take special measures to guarantee
the indigenous peoples of Peru the effective enjoyment
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, without
restrictions, and to make efforts to improve living conditions, participation, and development in the context of
12

respect for their cultural and religious values.”34
Peru, with 9.3 million indigenous people (47 percent of the
national population), is not the only country in Latin America to
ratify ILO 169. In fact, Latin America is the region that boasts
the most ratifications of this relatively new convention. Bolivia,
71 percent indigenous, ratified in 1992; Guatemala, 66 percent
indigenous, ratified ILO 169 in 1996 after integrating many of
its principles in that country’s 1995 Agreement on the Identity
and Rights of Indigenous Communities; Ecuador, 43 percent
indigenous, ratified in 1998; Honduras, 15 percent indigenous,
ratified in 1995; Mexico, 14 percent indigenous, ratified ILO
169 in 1990 and subsequently integrated many of its principles
into the 1996 peace accords with the Zapatistas (Acuerdo de San
Andrés Larraínzar); Paraguay, 3 percent indigenous, ratified in
1993; Colombia, 2 percent indigenous, ratified in 1991; Costa
Rica, 1 percent indigenous, ratified in 1993; and Argentina, 1
percent indigenous, ratified in 2000.35
It is therefore likely that the Inter-American Commission
and Court have both the power and the inclination to use ILO
169 to interpret the American Convention and treat the decisions
of the ILO Committee of Experts as instructive in doing so. It is
also apparent from the above mentioned statistics on populations and ratification that Latin American governments recognize the importance of ILO 169 as a tool to govern their relationships with the indigenous populations that live within their
borders. It is now important to look at specific mechanisms
within the inter-American system that advocates can utilize to
promote indigenous rights by compelling governments to take
their responsibilities seriously.

PRECAUTIONARY AND PROVISIONAL MEASURES
Article 25(1) of the Inter-American Commission’s Rules of
Procedure provides that “[i]n serious and urgent cases, and
whenever necessary according to the information available, the
Commission may, on its own initiative or at the request of a
party, request that the State concerned adopt precautionary
measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons.”36 Similarly,
Article 25(1) of the Inter-American Court’s Rules of Procedure,
echoing Article 63(2) of the American Convention, provides
that “[a]t any stage of the proceedings involving cases of
extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid
irreparable damage to persons, the Court may, at the request of
a party or on its own motion, order such provisional measures as
it deems pertinent…” Article 25(2) continues “[w]ith respect to
matters not yet submitted to it, the Court may act at the request
of the Commission.”37
Both precautionary and provisional measures offer a way for
parties to call on the authority of the inter-American bodies and
shed light on government activity that is violative or potentially
violative of the guarantees provided by the American
Convention. Often times, the diplomatic pressure that accompanies such measures or the simple reminder that the international
community sits in judgment of a government’s actions can be
enough to alter State activities to the benefit of the citizenry.
In September 6, 2002, the Inter-American Court ordered
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provisional measures for the Awas Tingni community, approximately one year after issuing its decision in that case (discussed
above). In July 2002, the community filed a brief with the Court
alleging that, contrary to the Court’s explicit order, the
Nicaraguan government was not preventing third parties from
causing detriment to the community’s property and thus hindering the process of demarcation and titling.38 As a result, the
Court ordered the Nicaraguan government to adopt measures to
protect the community’s land, particularly from irreparable
damage, and ordered the State to allow representatives from the
community to help in the planning and implementation of those
measures.39 Similar to the important precedent that the Awas
Tingni decision set, this award of provisional measures represents the Court’s understanding that indigenous property rights
are precarious, and that causing irreparable damage to property
in that context can cause “irreparable damage to persons.”
In May 2003, the Inter-American Commission awarded
precautionary measures to members of the Sarayaku indigenous
community in Ecuador. These measures were originally awarded because community members who opposed the presence of
petroleum companies in the area were being threatened and
assaulted. In October 2003, the community once again requested a hearing due to the Ecuadorian Government’s failure to
comply with the original order.40 In that hearing, counsel for the
community highlighted Article 84 of the Ecuadorian
Constitution, which articulates the responsibility of the state to
consult with indigenous communities about the exploitation of
non-renewable resources located in their traditional territories.
Counsel for the Sarayaku emphasized that the rights of the community included the right to participate in the government decision to award contracts for petroleum exploration and exploitation so as to attempt to prevent their own exposure to oil activities. The Inter-American Commission extended the precautionary measures for an additional six months at the hearing.
It is important to note that the argument made by counsel
for the Sarayaku community is analogous to the argument under
ILO 169 suggested by this paper. The single difference is that
the measures awarded were awarded primarily on the basis of
the threats to the physical integrity of the community members.
The goal is to have measures awarded on the sole basis of a failure to consult indigenous peoples at the initiation of a development project that will affect their environment. It would appear
from the decisions cited throughout this paper that the
Commission and the Court are prepared to award measures on
this basis. Bringing the authority of the inter-American adjudicatory bodies to bear would provide another important outlet for
the efforts of indigenous rights advocates, already very active on
the domestic level.

CONCLUSION: DEMANDING A SEAT AT THE TABLE
As Latin American governments struggle with the question
of development, simultaneously struggling with internal strife
and the notes for overwhelming debts held by foreign lenders,
they must constantly be reminded that some casualties are unacceptable. Prior informed consent represents the balancing of
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

indigenous rights to land and culture and the state’s right to
develop. This solution should be promoted on all levels of civil
and political society.
As mentioned above, environmental and indigenous rights
activists are already very active on the local level promoting
positive legislation and urging governments to consult and
negotiate with indigenous peoples. Currently, the UN and the
OAS are drafting declarations on the rights of indigenous peoples. These declarations once adopted and opened for ratification, will provide additional international legal sources for the
articulation of the rights and responsibilities implicated by prior
informed consent. However, this problem cannot wait for the
slow process of treaty negotiations. This is a problem of an
urgent nature because destructive development projects cause
irreversible damage to indigenous communities. This is the concern with resorting solely to the ILO Committee to resolve
issues involving prior informed consent. A lengthy petitioning
process simply takes too long. Similarly, this is not the type of
problem that can endure the admissibility and merits phase of
the Inter-American Commission, only to reach the Court years
after filing the original petition. Indeed, it was in anticipation of
immediate threats to fundamental rights like those that implicate
prior informed consent that precautionary and provisional measures were created.
Consulting indigenous peoples before and during the
implementation of development projects is essential to promote
and protect indigenous rights within a workable model of sustainable development. By using ILO 169 as a basis for soliciting
precautionary and provisional measures in the inter-American
human rights system, advocates can educate the international
community about their oppression, help articulate indigenous
rights under the law, inform governments of their responsibilities to indigenous communities, shame governments that do not
respect those rights, and pressure those governments to live up
to their responsibilities.

SUMMER 2004
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